Expanding the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act: An Examination of the Seventh Circuit\u27s Opinion in Green v. U.S. Cash Advance, Illinois, LLC by Milkowski, Christine L.
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 9 Issue 1 Article 4 
9-1-2013 
Expanding the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act: An 
Examination of the Seventh Circuit's Opinion in Green v. U.S. Cash 
Advance, Illinois, LLC 
Christine L. Milkowski 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christine L. Milkowski, Expanding the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act: An Examination of the Seventh 
Circuit's Opinion in Green v. U.S. Cash Advance, Illinois, LLC, 9 Seventh Circuit Rev. 20 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss1/4 
This Consumer Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College 
of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons 
@ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 




EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION ACT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S OPINION IN GREEN V. U.S. 
CASH ADVANCE, ILLINOIS, LLC 
 
 
CHRISTINE L. MILKOWSKI 
 
Cite as: Christine L. Milkowski, Expanding the Scope of the Federal Arbitration 
Act: An Examination of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Green v. U.S. Cash 
Advance, Illinois, LLC, 9 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 50 (2013), at http:// 





 Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 in 
response to judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements.
1
 Over 
three quarters of a century later American courts seem to have 
outgrown this former sentiment, as the Supreme Court’s recent 
application of the FAA has ushered in a new era of pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence.
2
 Although conceding that arbitration is, at heart, a 
matter of contract law,
3
 the Court has zealously applied Section 2 of 
the FAA, which states arbitration agreements shall be “valid, 
irrevocable and enforceable,”
4
 to favor arbitration over litigation.
5
  
                                                 
1
 Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Consumers 
From Significantly One-Sided Arbitration Clauses within Contracts of Adhesion, 91 
NEB. L. REV. 666, 668 (2013). 
2
 Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-
Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 323, 325 (2011).  
3
 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013). 
4
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
1
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 Writing in the Supreme Court’s shadow, in Green v. U.S. Cash 
Advance Illinois, LLC, the Seventh Circuit majority enforced an 
arbitration agreement in a payday loan between a consumer, Ms. 
Green and lender, the Loan Machine.
6
 The arbitration agreement 
identified the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”) as the arbitration 
forum in the event of a dispute; however, the NAF had stopped 
accepting consumer arbitrations due to a settlement agreement with 
the Minnesota Attorney General.
7
 Although the NAF’s settlement 
agreement occurred prior to Ms. Green’s loan, the parties never 
updated the language of the Loan Machine’s form arbitration 
agreement.
8
 The majority engaged in an ad hoc analysis to reach the 
wrong conclusion – the enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
despite the unavailability of the NAF.
9
   
 In its opinion, the majority rejected what is known as the integral 
part test, which has been used by the Third, Fifth and Eleventh 
circuits
10
 in factually similar situations. The integral part test bars the 
appointment of a substitute arbitrator if the provision naming the 
arbitrator was “an integral part of the agreement.”
11
    
 Judge Hamilton, in dissent, also rejected the integral part test, 
however, he contended that the unavailability of the arbitration forum 
renders the arbitration agreement void, allowing the parties to proceed 
with litigation.
12
 He noted the majority’s reasoning departed from the 
contractual foundation of arbitration because the NAF as the parties’ 
exclusive choice of forum, was not available at the time of contracting 
                                                                                                                   
5
 See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 2304 (2013). 
6
 Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). 
7
 Id. at 789. 
8




 Id. at 791; see Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350, 354-56 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App'x 174, 176 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Brown v. ITT 
Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000). 
11
 Khan, 669 F. 3d at 353. 
12
 Green, 734 F.3d at 793 (Hamilton, J. dissenting). 
2
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and thus the agreement was void.
13
 Judge Hamilton argued that the 
practical result of the majority approach is that a court may use the 
FAA to authorize a “wholesale re-write of the parties’ contract”
14
 when 
there had been a mutual mistake as to a material term. 
This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit majority reached 
the wrong conclusion in Green. Part I of this Comment introduces the 
FAA and the two sections at issue in the case. Part II reviews the 
Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of the FAA. Part III introduces 
the problem presented in Green, examines the solutions implemented 
by other circuits, and discusses the Green decision. Part IV considers 
the decision’s impact on the parties and future litigants, and addresses 
proposed solutions.   
 




 Arbitration is a method of dispute resolution involving one or 
more neutral third parties who are usually agreed to by the disputing 




 Congress passed the 
Federal Arbitration Act, formerly the “United States Arbitration 
Law,”
17
 in response to widespread judicial hostility towards arbitration 
agreements.
18
 The aggression exhibited by United States courts has 






 Arbitration Definition, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available 
at Westlaw BLACKS.  
16
 Raymond, supra note 1, at 668.  
17
 Angelina M. Petti, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: The 
Stay-Dismissal Dichotomy of FAA Section 3, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 565, 572 (2005). 
18
 Raymond, supra note 1, at 668#; see also Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial 
Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and 
Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 476 (2006) (noting that although 
this law was enacted in 1925, American judicial hostility persisted until 1967 when 
the United States Supreme Court decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
Mfg. Co., when the Court “eliminated any powerful judicial role in supervising 
arbitration agreements.”). 
3
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been linked to the same opposition expressed by English courts.
19
 
English courts viewed an arbitration agreement as ousting the court of 
its jurisdiction until England’s Arbitration Act of 1889, which provided 
the country’s first set of laws to facilitate arbitration.
20
 Explanations 
for American judicial hostility towards such agreements are similar to 
that of the English – that it would oust the jurisdiction of the court; but 




In the early twentieth century, American judges began to change 
their minds about the enforceability of arbitration agreements.
22
 This 
change culminated in a 1924 New York state court decision, Red Cross 
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
23
 which upheld a New York law compelling 
arbitration in a dispute involving a maritime contract.
24
 Julius Cohen, a 
lawyer who was later the principal drafter of the FAA, wrote that New 
York law.
25
 Red Cross Line paved the way for Congress to enact a 
federal arbitration law that recognized arbitration agreements as 
binding and valid: the Federal Arbitration Act.
26
  
                                                 
19
 Preston Douglas Wigner, The United States Supreme Court's Expansive 
Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act: A Look at the Past, Present, and Future of 
Section 2, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1499, 1502 (1995). 
20
 Burton, supra note 18, at 474. Additionally, English Judges were paid based 
on the number of cases they decided, and as a result, felt that arbitration outside of 
the courtroom infringed upon their livelihood. Wigner, supra note 19, at 1502. 
21
 Stephen E. Friedman, The Lost Controversy Limitation of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (2012); see also Kulukundis 
Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982–85 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(Justice Frank discussing the history of the judicial attitude towards arbitration). 
22
 John C. Norling, The Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's Preemption 
Power: An Examination of the Import of Saturn Distribution Corp. v. Williams, 7 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 139, 140 (1991).  
23
 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924). 
24
 JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RES. SERVICE, THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION 
ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2003) 
25
 Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court 
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA ST. U. L. 
REV. 99, 101-02 (2006). 
26
 SHIMABUKURO, supra note 24, at 2.  
4
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President Coolidge signed the Federal Arbitration Act into law on 
February 12, 1925.
27
 During the Joint Hearings on the FAA, a 
chairman from the Joint Subcommittee on the Judiciary asked Mr. 
Cohen why a contract for arbitration had not been enforceable in 
equity.
28
 Mr. Cohen stated that “the fundamental reason” for it’s non-
enforceability, was that stronger men would take advantage of the 
weaker, and that “courts had to come in and protect them.”
29
 However, 
Mr. Cohen noted that this concern was dispelled by the regulation of 
the Federal Government and the general notion that “people are 
protected today [sic] as never before.”
30
  
 As drafted, the FAA was understood by members of Congress to 
“simply provide for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to 
enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty 
contracts.”
31
 Throughout the 1924 Hearing, statements were made that 
“arbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money.”
32
 Thus, the 
legislative history of the FAA suggests two purposes: to affirm the 
validity of arbitration agreements as “binding contract provisions in 












 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 
646 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 14 (1924) (statement of 
Julius Henry Cohen, Member, Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of 
the Am. Bar Ass'n and Gen. Counsel of N.Y. State Chamber of Commerce).  
29
 Id. at 15.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124 (2001) (Stevens, J. 
dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
32
 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 
646 Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7 (1924) (statement of 
Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman Comm. on Arbitration). 
33
 Benjamin D. Tievsky, The Federal Arbitration Act After Alafabco: A Case 
Analysis, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 675, 678 (2010). 
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At the heart of the legal dispute in Green was the enforceability of 
the arbitration clause in a payday loan agreement, which named an 
unavailable arbitration forum.
34
 To answer this question, the court 
looked to Section 2 and Section 5 of the FAA.
35
  
Section 2 evidences Congress’s intent to place arbitration 
agreements “upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] 
belong.”
36
 It provides that a written arbitration agreement in a 
transaction or contract involving commerce is “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”
37
 Thus, Section 2 is a platform for the 




Section 5, on the other hand, is a tool that allows the judiciary to 
appointment an arbitrator in limited circumstances.
39
 Those 
circumstances are: if no method of naming an arbitrator is provided for 
in the agreement; if there is a method of naming the arbitrator, but a 
party fails to avail himself of that method; and if for any other reason 
there is a “lapse” in the naming of an arbitrator.
40
 While Section 5 is 
the specific tool the Green majority used to enforce the arbitration 
                                                 
34
 Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 791-93 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
35
 Id. at 792–93. 
36
 SHIMABUKURO, supra note 24, at 2 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
37
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The complete text of Section 2:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole 
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract 
38
 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 472 U.S. 614, 625 
(1985). 
39
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clause in the loan agreement, the Seventh Circuit also followed the 
footsteps of the Supreme Court, which has consistently enforced 
arbitration agreements using Section 2 of the FAA. 
 
II. THE FAA AND RECENT PRO-ARBITRATION SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 
 
In the years before Green, the application of the FAA by the 
Roberts Court has been pro-arbitration, resulting in a trend of favoring 
big business over small business, and business over the consumer.
41
 In 
the 2010-2011 term, the Supreme Court decided what has been 
referred to as an arbitration trilogy.
42
 This triad of cases demonstrates a 
strong federal policy of vigorously enforcing agreements to arbitrate. 
Then, in the summer of 2013 the Supreme Court added to the spirit of 
this trilogy with a fourth decision, American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant. 
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., the first in this 
series of four decisions, a group of parcel tanker
43
 customers brought a 
class action antitrust suit against Stolt-Nielsen, a shipping company, 
for price fixing.
44
 The parties eventually agreed they must arbitrate 
their antitrust claim pursuant to the arbitration agreement in their 
charter contract, but they were unsure whether the arbitration 
agreement permitted class arbitration.
45
 This question was submitted 
to a panel of arbitrators, who after hearing argument and evidence 
concluded that the arbitration clause allowed class arbitration.
46
 
                                                 
41
 See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011); Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
42
 Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 328.  
43
 Parcel tankers are seagoing vessels with compartments that are separately 
chartered to customers such as AnimalFeeds, who shipped liquids in small 
quantities. Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010). 
44
 Id. at 667. 
45
 Id. at 668. 
46
 Id. at 668–69.  
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However, the Supreme Court reversed, and found the arbitration 
agreement must be enforced according to its terms.
47
  
During litigation, AnimalFeeds stipulated the arbitration provision 
in their charter contract was silent on the issue of class arbitration,
48
 
and argued that without express prohibition, class arbitration should be 
permitted.
49
 As arbitration is a matter of contract, the Court concluded 
that a party, even a sophisticated business entity, “may not be 
compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is 
a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed to do so.”
50
 
Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is a foundation of contract law, which 
requires a meeting of the minds to establish a valid contract.
51
 Thus, 
the court held that there could be no class-action arbitration when the 
parties have conceded there was no prior agreement on the matter.
52
 
The Court mandated bilateral arbitration.
53
 
Later that year, in the second of the four cases, the Court 
addressed how a party can challenge the validity of an arbitration 
agreement. There are two types of validity challenges: one challenges 
the validity of the arbitration agreement itself and the other challenges 
the contract as a whole.
54
 If the arbitration agreement itself is 
challenged and determined to be invalid by the court, it can be severed 
from the remainder of the contract.
55
 In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. 
Jackson, an employee filed a discrimination suit against his former 
employer, who responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration 
pursuant to the employment contract.
56
 The employee argued that the 
entire employment contract was unconscionable and should not be 
                                                 
47
 Id. at 682. 
48
 Id. at 668. 
49
 Id. at 672. 
50
 Id. at 684 (alteration in original).  
51
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17 cmt. c (1981).  
52
 Id. at 687; see also Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 333.  
53
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 559 U.S. at 687. 
54





 Id. at 2775. 
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 The Court concluded that because the employee was 
challenging the contract as a whole, rather than the arbitration 
agreement itself, this challenge was for the arbitrator to resolve.
58
 
Thus, the Court limited its ability to police an overreaching arbitration 




In the third case, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion the Court 
revisited a claim for class arbitration and ruled in a 5-4 opinion that 
the FAA preempted a state law prohibiting adhesion contracts from 
disallowing class arbitration.
60
 The plaintiffs had alleged that AT&T 
engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging a sales tax on 
“free” phones.
61
 The lawsuit, originally filed by the Concepcions, was 
consolidated as a class action. AT&T then filed a motion to compel 
arbitration under the Concepcions’ cell phone contract, which stated 
that class arbitration was waived.
62
  
The District Court and then the Ninth Circuit applied California’s 
unconscionability doctrine,
63
 as expressed in the state court decision 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, to invalidate the class waiver in the 
Concepcions’ cell phone contract.
64
 The Discover Bank doctrine 
allows any party to a consumer contract of adhesion to demand 
                                                 
57
 Id. at 2779. 
58
 Id.  
59
 Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 367, 370.  
60
 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
61
 Id. at 1744–45. 
62
 Id. at 1744. 
63
 Id. at 1746, citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 
(Cal. 2005) which held:  
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver 
becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] 
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and 
should not be enforced. 
64
 AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
9
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classwide arbitration ex post.
65
 A sharply divided Supreme Court 
reversed the lower courts’ application of the Discover Bank doctrine in 
AT&T Mobility, concluding the FAA preempted the doctrine.
66
 The 
Court stated that this doctrine “interfere[d] with fundamental attributes 
of arbitration”
67
 and that “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration 
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration – its informality – 
which makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to 
generate procedural morass than final judgment.”
68
 Thus, according to 
the Supreme Court, a fundamental attribute of arbitration is the 
efficient and speedy resolution of disputes, which would be 
undermined by the Discover Bank doctrine.  
In the fourth case, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant, a group of plaintiffs again attempted to defeat an 
arbitration clause that prohibited class arbitration. However, rather 
than relying on a state law, like the plaintiffs in AT&T Mobility, the 
plaintiffs in American Express Co. argued the individual cost of 
arbitrating their federal antitrust claims exceeded any potential 
recovery.
69
 Applying Section 2 of the FAA, the Court began its 
analysis by reminding the parties that courts must “rigorously enforce” 
arbitration agreements according to their terms.
70
 The Court concluded 
that the FAA did not permit it to invalidate a contractual waiver of 
class arbitration on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually 
arbitrating a claim exceeded the potential recovery.
71
  
Thus, in the foregoing cases the Court disempowered an arbitrator 
to make determinations of class arbitration, compelling bilateral 
arbitration unless otherwise agreed; over-empowered an arbitrator to 
                                                 
65
 Id. at 1750. 
66
 Id. at 1753. 
67
 Id. at 1748. 
68
 Id. at 1751. 
69
 Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
70
 Id. at 2309 (citation omitted). Particularly interesting is the court’s statement 
that “courts must rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, 
including terms that specify with whom the parties choose to arbitrate their disputes 
and the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.” Id. (emphasis added) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
71
 Id. at 2311–12. 
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determine his own jurisdiction; and expressed a clear disapproval of 
class arbitration. The Supreme Court came to these three sweeping 
conclusions using the language of the FAA.  
 
III. GREEN V. U.S. CASH ADVANCE ILLINOIS, LLC 
 
In May 2012, U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC and Title Loan 
Company (doing business as “the Loan Machine”) offered to roll over 
$200 in debt owed by Joyce Green, a senior citizen,
72
 into a payday 
loan in the amount of $1,650.
73
 The new payday loan agreement and 
its Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement stated the loan was subject 
to a 36% finance charge.
74
 However, Ms. Green discovered that due to 
other charges described in the loan documents, the actual finance 
charge exceeded 200% and a bill later provided to her stated the 
“effective APR” was 200.84%.
75
 In light of these finance charges, Ms. 
Green brought claims for violations of Truth in Lending Act,
76
 the 
Illinois Consumer Installment Loan Act,
77
 the Illinois Payday Loan 
Reform Act,
78
 and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive 
Business Practices Act,
79




The payday loan agreement entered into by Ms. Green in May 
2012 contained an arbitration clause, which required that all disputes 
                                                 
72
 Paul Bland, Activist Seventh Circuit Panel Helps Out Payday Lender by Re-




 Brief of Appellee at *3, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 787 






 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012). 
77
 205 Ill. Comp. Stat. 670/1 (2012). 
78
 81 Ill. Comp. Stat. 122/4-10(b) (2005). 
79
 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10a (1986). 
80
 Brief of Appellee at *3–4, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 
787 (7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262). 
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between the parties be settled by binding arbitration.
81
 The arbitration 
clause named the NAF as arbitrator.
82
 However, in July 2009, almost 
three years prior to Ms. Green entering her payday loan agreement, the 
NAF stopped accepting consumer arbitrations as a condition of its 
settlement agreement with the Minnesota Attorney General.
83
 This 
settlement agreement was a result of a law enforcement investigation, 
which led to a lawsuit alleging that the NAF was not an impartial 
venue.
84
 As one commentator put it, “the NAF was a deeply corrupt 




Despite the fact that the NAF stopped accepting consumer 
arbitration disputes in 2009, the Loan Machine failed to amend its 
payday loan agreements to reflect this change.
86
 In 2012, these loan 
agreements still stated that all disputes were to be resolved through 
                                                 
81
 Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F. 3d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 
2013). 
82
 Id. at 788. 
83
 See Wade Goodwyn, Arbitration Firm Settles Minnesota Legal Battle, NPR 
(July 23, 2009, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106913248. Guests of the 
show discussed the NAF settlement, and noted that the arbitration forum conducts 
hundreds of thousands of consumer arbitrations a year, most of them involving debt 
collection. The investigation of the Minnesota Attorney General revealed that NAF 
is 40% owned by a hedge fund, which also owned debt collection agencies, making 
the NAF a party to the dispute as well as judge and jury. See also Carrick 
Mollenkamp, Dionne Searcey & Nathan Koppel, Turmoil in Arbitration Empire 
Upends Credit-Card Disputes, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2009 at 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB125548128115183913) (noting that another 
consumer-debt-arbitration forum, the American Arbitration Association has also 
stopped hearing consumer debt cases.).  
84
 For a copy of the Minnesota Attorney General’s Complaint, see 
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/SignedFiledComplaintArbitrationCo
mpany.pdf (last accessed November 7, 2013). For a brief overview of the lawsuit, 
see Minnesota Sues a Credit Arbitrator, Citing Bias, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK 




 Paul Bland, supra note 72. 
86
 Green, 724 F. 3d at 788. 
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“binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of 
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”
87
 In response to Ms. 
Green’s complaint, and despite the unavailability of the NAF, the Loan 
Machine moved to compel arbitration, stay proceedings, and dismiss 
class claims by arguing that Section 5 of the FAA required the court to 
appoint a substitute arbitrator.
88
 This issue was not novel, as other 
courts
89
 have faced the question of what to do with an arbitration 
agreement where the named arbitration forum was unavailable.  
 
 
                                                 
87
 Id.  
88
 Brief of Appellee at 4–5, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 787 
(7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262). Paragraph 17 of the loan agreement stated: 
ARBITRATION: All disputes, claims or controversies between the parties of 
this Agreement, including all disputes, claims or controversies arising from or 
relating to this Agreement, no matter by whom or against whom, including the 
validity of this Agreement and the obligations and scope of the arbitration 
clause, shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under 
the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum. This arbitration 
agreement is made pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall 
be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. Section 1. The parties 
agree and understand that they choose arbitration instead of litigation to resolve 
disputes. The parties understand that they have a right or opportunity to litigate 
disputes through a court, but that they prefer to resolve their disputes through 
arbitration, except as provided herein. THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE HAD 
A RIGHT OR OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE DISPUTES THROUGH A 
COURT BUT HAVE AGREED TO RESOLVE DISPUTES THROUGH 
BINDING ARBITRATION, EXCEPT THAT THE TITLE LENDER MAY 
CHOOSE AT TITLE LENDER’S SOLDE OPTION TO SEEK COLLECTION 
OF PAYMENT(S) DUE IN COURT RATHER THAN THROUGH 
ARBITRATION. THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY 
WAIVE ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL EITHER 
PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR PURSUANT 
TO A COURT ACTION BY A TITLE LENDER. The parties agree and 
understand that all other laws and actions, including, but not limited to, all 
contract tort and property disputes will be subject to binding arbitration in 
accord with this agreement. 
89
 See Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350 (3d Cir. 2012); Brown v. ITT 
Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000); Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. 
App'x 174 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
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A. Prior Circuit Court Decisions 
 
In deciding what to do when the named arbitration forum is 
unavailable, several circuit courts have analyzed the issue by asking 
whether the choice of the arbitration forum was an integral part of the 
arbitration agreement.
90
 Applying this test, the Fifth Circuit found a 
named forum was integral to the arbitration agreement, and refused to 







 Circuits, on the other hand, have applied this 
test to similar facts but concluded that a named forum was not integral 
to the arbitration agreement and invoked Section 5 to appoint a 
substitute arbitrator. 
In Ranzy v. Tijerina the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a 
consumer action against a payday loan company.
94
 Similar to the facts 
in Green, the loan agreement contained an arbitration clause naming 
the NAF as arbitrator.
95
 After entering the loan agreement but before 
litigation, the NAF became unavailable,
96
 and as a result the loan 
company urged the court to use Section 5 of the FAA to appoint a 
substitute arbitrator.
97
 The court stated, “Section 5 does not . . . permit 
a district court to circumvent the parties’ designation of an exclusive 
arbitration forum when the choice of that forum is an integral part of 
                                                 
90
 A number of state court opinions have also adopted the integral part test, 
including Illinois, (Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 327 (Ill. 2011)); Virginia, 
(Schuiling v. Harris, 747 S.E.2d 833 (Va. 2013)); New Mexico, (Rivera v. Am. Gen. 
Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803 (N.M. 2011)); South Dakota, (Wright v. GGNSC 
Holdings LLC, 808 N.W.2d 114 (S.D. 2011)); Georgia (Miller v. GGNSC Atlanta, 
LLC, 746 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)); Indiana, (Geneva-Roth, Capital, Inc. v. 
Edwards, 956 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)); Wisconsin, (Riley v. Extendicare 
Health Facilities, Inc. 826 N.W.2d 398 (Wis. Ct. App. 2012)); and Pennsylvania 
(Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010)). 
91
 Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App'x 174, 175 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
92
 Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350, 354–56 (3d Cir. 2012). 
93
 Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000). 
94
 Ranzy, 393 F. App'x at 175. 
95
 Id.  
96
 Ranzy v. Extra Cash of Texas, Inc., CIV.A. H-09-3334, (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 
2010), aff'd sub nom, Ranzy v. Tijerina, 393 F. App'x 174 (5th Cir. 2010). 
97
 Ranzy, 393 F. App’x at 175.  
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the agreement to arbitrate, rather than an ancillary logistical 
concern.”
98
 Thus, the court asked whether the parties had agreed that 
the NAF was the exclusive forum. Noting the agreement stated the 
parties “shall” submit all claims to the NAF, the Fifth Circuit found 
the NAF was the exclusive arbitration forum and due to the NAF’s 
unavailability, allowed the parties to proceed in litigation.
99
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied on a Second 
Circuit decision, In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative 
Litigation, which is addressed by the Green court.
100
 The agreement to 
arbitrate in Salomon named the New York Stock Exchange as the 
forum for dispute resolution.
101
 Once submitted to the NYSE 
arbitrator, the NYSE’s rules allowed its Secretary to decide whether to 
hear a dispute or send the parties to court.
102
 There, the Secretary 
invoked his discretion to decline arbitration.
103
 However, rather than 
proceed with litigation, the defendants moved the court to appoint a 
substitute arbitrator under Section 5 of the FAA.
104
 The defendants 
argued that the language of the agreement, which required disputes to 
be arbitrated by the NYSE and in accordance with its rules, was akin 
to a choice of law provision that allowed arbitration to proceed in 
another forum using the NYSE rules.
105
 The Second Circuit rejected 
this argument, and declined to appoint a substitute arbitrator because 
the parties had contractually agreed that the NYSE and only the NYSE 
could arbitrate any disputes between them.
106
 
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the 
choice of the NAF as arbitration forum was an integral part of the 
arbitration agreement.
107
 In Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 
                                                 
98
 Id. at 176 (citation omitted). 
99
 Id. at 176. 
100
 Id.  
101
 In re Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation, 68 F.3d 554, 555 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
102
 Id. at 556. 
103
 Id.  
104
 Id. at 555–56. 
105
 Id. at 558. 
106
 Id. at 559. 
107
 Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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the Eleventh Circuit found no evidence that the choice of the NAF as 
the arbitration forum was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate 
disputes.
108
 In light of this absence of evidence, the court held the 
unavailability of the NAF did not destroy the arbitration clause and it 
affirmed the lower court’s appointment of a substitute arbitrator.
109
  
Similarly, the Third Circuit in Khan v. Dell, Inc. applied the 
integral part test. There, Raheel Ahmad Khan filed a consumer class 
action for defectively designed computers sold by Dell.
110
 When Khan 
purchased his Dell computer, he entered into a clickwrap agreement,
111
 
which contained an arbitration provision.
112
 Like the plaintiffs in 
Ranzy and Brown, Khan asserted that the arbitration provision was 
unenforceable because the NAF, which was the designated arbitration 
forum, was no longer permitted to conduct consumer arbitrations.
113
 




The Third Circuit defined the integral part test as the parties 
having “unambiguously expressed their intent not to arbitrate their 
disputes in the event that the designated arbitral forum is 
unavailable.”
115
 After reviewing the language of the agreement and 
considering conflicting interpretations of the same or similar 
agreements by other courts, the Third Circuit determined that the 
language of the arbitration agreement was ambiguous. In light of the 
“liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration,” the court used Section 5 
of the FAA to appoint a substitute arbitrator.
116
  




 Id.  
110
 Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F. 3d 350, 352 (3d Cir. 2012). 
111
 A clickwrap agreement appears on an internet webpage and requires that a 
user consent to any terms or conditions by clicking on a dialog box on the screen in 
order to proceed with the internet transaction. Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 
306 F.3d 17, 22, n.4 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  
112
 Khan, 669 F. 3d at 351. 
113




 Id. at 354. 
116
 Id. at 356. 
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Although ultimately reaching different conclusions, the three 
circuits that have addressed the issue of what to do when a named 
arbitration forum is unavailable have agreed that the integral part test 
was the correct analysis. The District Court in Green was no different.  
 
B. The District Court Decision: Application of the Integral Part Test 
 
The district court used Section 2 of the FAA to begin its 
analysis,
117
 which provides that written provisions in a contract “to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”
118
 Thus, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly done, the 
district court acknowledged a judicial policy of favoring arbitration. 
The district court then used the integral part test as the threshold 
analysis to determine whether Section 5 could be invoked. 
The district court used five factors pulled from various federal 
circuit and district court decisions to determine whether the 
designation of the NAF was “integral” to the agreement.
119
 These 
factors were: 1) whether the language designating the arbitrator is 
mandatory or permissive; 2) whether the arbitration clause designates 
a particular arbitrator or merely a particular set of rules to be applied; 
3) whether the arbitration agreement contains a 'severance' provision 
or a provision for substitution of the arbitrator; 4) the relative weight 
in the arbitration agreement given to the designation of the arbitrator 
versus the requirement that disputes be sent to binding arbitration; and 




First, the district court found that the use of the word “shall” 
favored the designation of the NAF as integral to the arbitration 
                                                 
117
 Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, No. 12 C 8079, 2013 WL 
317046, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2013), vacated and remanded, 724 F.3d 787 (7th 
Cir. 2013).  
118
 Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). 
119
 Id. at *4. 
120
 Id.  
17
Milkowski: Expanding the Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act: An Examinatio
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013






 Second, because the agreement states that arbitration be 
conducted by the NAF as well as under its code of procedure, there is 
merit in finding that the NAF is an integral part of the agreement.
122
 
Third, the district court found that although the loan agreement had a 
severance clause, a severance statement did not appear in the 
arbitration agreement itself.
123
 Therefore, the district court reasoned, 
the arbitration agreement would not remain valid if the designation of 
the arbitration forum failed.
124
 Fourth, the plaintiff was required to 
arbitrate and the Loan Machine had the option to arbitrate or pursue a 
bench trial, and as such the court found this factor to be neutral.
125
 
Lastly, the district court found that the NAF settlement agreement with 
the Minnesota Attorney General supported the conclusion that the 




Based on this five-factor analysis, the district court concluded that 
the designation of the NAF was integral to the agreement, and as such 
the district court could not apply Section 5 of the FAA.
127
 The district 
court allowed the parties to proceed in litigation. 
 
C. An Interlocutory Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
 
After the district court found the arbitration clause void, the Loan 
Machine took an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
128
 On 
appeal, the Loan Machine argued that the designation of the NAF was 
an “ancillary logistical concern” and not an integral part of the 
agreement, and that a substitute arbitrator should be appointed under 
Section 5 of the FAA.
129
 Green argued that the designation of the NAF 
                                                 
121
 Id.  
122
 Id. at *5. 
123










 Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).  
129
 Brief of Appellee at *3, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 787 
(7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262). 
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was integral to the arbitration agreement; therefore, the arbitration 
agreement was void and unenforceable.
130
 In the alternative, Green 
argued the court should strike the arbitration agreement as void 
because it was a scheme to defraud her, and that NAF’s code of 





1. Chief Judge Easterbook’s Majority Opinion 
 
The majority opinion, written by famously conservative
132
 Judge 
Easterbook, rejected the integral part test and instead stretched the 
language of the arbitration agreement to invoke Section 5 of the FAA 
to appoint a substitute arbitrator.
133
 
First, the majority rejected the integral part test used by the 
district court and other circuit courts.
134
 The majority called the 
integral part test an “escape hatch” that came about in the “fashion of a 
rumor chain.”
135
 They traced the origin of this test to a 1990 Northern 
District of Illinois opinion in which Judge Moran, in dicta, stated that 
the choice of a particular forum was not “integral” to the parties 
bargain.
136
 The majority stated the background of the FAA does not 
authorize such an approach, and because it was not an established rule 
                                                 
130
 Brief of Appellant at *11–15, Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, 724 F.3d 
787 (7th Cir.) (No. 13-1262). 
131
 Id. at *18–25. 
132
 Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in A World of Pygmies? Testing 
the Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
1141, 1207 (2002). 
133
 Green, 724 F.3d at 788–93. 
134
 Id. at 792–93.  
135
 Id.   
136
 Id. at 792. The majority notes that Judge Moran cited to Nat'l Iranian Oil 
Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 817 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1987) and asked whether a 
particular arbitration forum was an “essential part of the parties’ bargain.” See 
Zechman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 
(N.D. Ill. 1990). The Fifth Circuit’s essential part inquiry in National Iranian Oil 
was grounded in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184, cmt. a, § 185(1) & 
cmt. B (1981). See Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 817 F.2d at 333–34. 
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of law, rejected it.
137
 The majority noted that an integral part test 
would also hinder the FAA’s promotion of arbitration as a fast and 
economical process because the only way to determine what is integral 




The court explored a brief tangent, offering that Section 2 of the 
FAA could be a possible foundation for the integral part test.
139
 
Section 2 states arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”
140
 Thus, if a mistake such as naming an unavailable 
arbitration forum permits revocation of the contract under state law 
principles, the court, in theory, could declare the contract 
unenforceable.
141
 The majority’s fleeting reflection abruptly ended 
when they stated that “[t]he identity of the arbitrator is not so 
important that the whole contract is vitiated” and continued its analysis 
on other grounds.
142
 The court gave no reason for this cursory 
conclusion. 
Second, the majority attempted to analyze the plain language of 
the arbitration clause to find that Section 5 of the FAA must be 
implemented.
143
 They focused on the phrase “shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of 
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”
144
 Their overly 
simplistic and again unexplained logic is that this language only calls 
for the use of the NAF’s Code of Procedure, and not for the NAF itself 
to conduct the arbitration.
145
 The majority tried to support its reading 
by stating the reference to the NAF’s Code of Procedure would 
otherwise be surplusage, and the only reason to refer to the code of 
                                                 
137
 Green, 724 F.3d at 792.  
138
 Id. at 792.  
139




 Id. Several states have already adopted the integral part test when it comes 
to arbitration agreements, including Illinois. See cases cited supra note 90. 
142
 Green, 724 F.3d at 791–92. 
143
 Id. at 789. 
144
 Id. (alteration in original).   
145
 Id.  
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procedure is to create the possibility of using it outside the NAF.
146
 
This is the precise argument that was considered and rejected by the 
Second Circuit in In re Salomon’s Shareholders Litigation.
147
 
Green argued that the majority’s interpretation conflicted with the 
rules in NAF’s Code of Procedure.
148
 Rule 1.A, in particular, states 
“this Code shall be administered only by the National Arbitration 
Forum or by any entity or individual providing administrative services 
by agreement with the National Arbitration Forum.”
149
 The majority 
retaliated with two other rules of the NAF Code. First, Rule 48.C 
states, “[i]n the event a court of competent jurisdiction shall find any 
portion of this Code . . . to be in violation of the law or otherwise 
unenforceable, that portion shall not be effective.”
150
 Second, Rule 
48.D states, “[i]f Parties are denied the opportunity to arbitrate a 
dispute, controversy or Claim before the Forum, the Parties may seek 
legal and other remedies in accord with applicable law.”
151
 Evaluating 
Rule 1.A in light of Rule 48.C, the majority deduced that Rule 1.A was 
unenforceable and severable because the NAF had ceased conducting 
consumer arbitrations.
152
 Further, the court found that Section 5 of the 
FAA is other “applicable law” and properly used as such under Rule 
48.D.
153
   
The majority supported its determination to appoint a substitute 
arbitrator with opinions from the Third and Eleventh Circuits. The 
                                                 
146
 Id. at 790. The court briefly addresses the potential copyright issue that may 
arise if another arbitrator uses the NAF’s code of procedure. It concludes, and the 
dissent agrees, that copyright law does not include the right to control how the owner 
of a copy uses the information it contains. Id. at 794–95. 
147
 See supra Section II(A).  
148








 Id. at 789–90. 
153
 Id. at 790. 
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court did this even though those circuits used the integral part test, 
which the majority had already rejected.
154
  
Lastly, the majority likened the arbitration agreement at issue with 
an arbitration clause devoid of detail, which may state “any disputes 
arising out of this contract will be arbitrated.”
155
 The majority 
concluded that Section 5 of the FAA would undoubtedly apply to that 
detail-free clause, and allow the court to supply particulars.
156
 
However, this argument stretches the imagination after comparing the 
majority’s imaginary ten-word clause to the extensive 251-word 
arbitration clause in Ms. Green’s loan agreement.
157
  
Perhaps understanding its ad hoc reasoning outlined above, the 
majority completed their opinion with a catch-all statement, that “one 
thing [is] clear: [the] parties selected private dispute resolution” and 
“Section 5 allows judges to supply details in order to make arbitration 
work.”
158
 Therefore, the court vacated the district court’s decision and 
remanded for the district judge to appoint a substitute arbitrator.
159
 
The majority opinion was devoid of any analysis based in contract 
principles. However, the dissent considers that arbitration is based on 
the foundations of contract law, and emphasizes that the fact that the 
NAF was never available to the parties was a mistake which renders 
the contract voidable.  
 
2. Judge Hamilton’s Dissent 
 
Judge Hamilton began his dissent by reflecting on the majority’s 
reasoning as “an extraordinary effort to rescue the payday lender-
defendant from its own folly, or perhaps its own fraud.”
160
 Judge 
Hamilton correctly opined that arbitration is a matter of contract, and 
                                                 
154
 Id. 790–91 (These opinions are Khan v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 
2012); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir. 2012); and 
Brown v. ITT Consumer Financial Corp., 211 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)).  
155
 Id. at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
156
 Id.  
157
 See supra note 88 for the complete language of the arbitration clause. 
158




 Id. at 793 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
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reminded his readers that the Supreme Court has reflected, “the FAA’s 




Judge Hamilton contextualized his dissent by stressing the unique 
facts of the case.
162
 He reminded the reader that the NAF was sued for 
consumer fraud, and as a result settled the case and announced it 
would no longer accept consumer cases for arbitration.
163
 Furthermore, 
the payday loan agreement between Ms. Green and the Loan Machine 
was a contract of adhesion.
164
 After engaging in the legal fiction that 
Ms. Green “read, understood, and embraced” the arbitration 
agreement, the dissent framed the issue as: what was the parties’ 
mutual intention for what would happen to their arbitration agreement 
if the NAF were not available to perform the arbitration?
165
  
Like the majority, the dissent analyzed the plain language of the 
arbitration agreement, focusing on the words “shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration by one arbitrator by and under the Code of 
Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum.”
166
 Breaking down this 
clause into several elements, Judge Hamilton concluded that “there 
was no indication that anyone other than the [NAF] was satisfactory to 
the parties.”
167
 Judge Hamilton also argued that the natural reading of 
the phrase suggested that the arbitration would be conducted by the 
NAF and according to the NAF rules.
168
  
Unlike the majority, which severed the rules of the NAF Code of 
Procedure that did not support its opinion, Judge Hamilton used the 
                                                 
161
 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
162
 Id. at 794. 
163
 Id. The Third Circuit in Khan, discussed  in Section II(A), framed the 
integral part test as: did the parties unambiguously express their intent not to 
arbitrate their disputes in the event the named forum became unavailable? Khan v. 
Dell Inc., 669 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2012). Although the dissent rejects the “integral 
part” test, perhaps it is only in name as Justice Hamilton’s inquiry is merely another 
side of the question posed by Khan. 
164




 Id. at 794–95. 
167
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Rules in a common sense way to support the natural reading of the 
arbitration agreement.
169
 The dissent found that applying “simple 
logic” to Rule 1.A meant the terms of the parties’ contract required the 
application of the NAF’s Code of Procedure.
170
  
Section 5 of the FAA allows appointment of a substitute arbitrator 
in three circumstances.
171
 First, when the agreement does not provide 
for a method in naming the arbitrator.
172
 This does not apply to the 
agreement between Ms. Green and the Loan Machine because a 
method was provided.
173
 Second, if a method was provided but a party 
failed to avail itself of such a method.
174
 Again, this does not apply to 
the facts at hand.
175
 Third, if for any other reason there is a lapse in 
naming the arbitrator.
176
 This residuary phrase did fit, thus, whether 
Section 5 applied depended on what was a “lapse.”
177
 The dissent 
summarily found that there was no correctable “lapse” when the 




The dissent noted that no other circuit with which the majority 
agreed has adopted the same reasoning, or has gone through such 
lengths to “rescue a more deeply flawed” arbitration agreement.
179
  
The dissent relied on the logic from a Second Circuit case, In re 
Salomon Inc. Shareholders’ Derivative Litigation, to conclude that the 
arbitration agreement was void.
180
 The dissent argued that Salomon 
                                                 
169
 Id. at 795–96. 
170
 Id. at 795. Judge Hamilton engages in a brief aside whereby he agrees with 
the Majority opinion that copyright law does not prevent others from using the Code 
of procedure. Id. However, he does note that trademark law may prevent competitors 
from using the Code because the NAF branded itself by building a strongly pro-
business reputation. Id. at 791–92. 
171
 Id. at 796. 
172














 Id. at 796. 
180
 Id. at 797–98. 
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was on all fours with the instant matter.
181
 As discussed in Section 
II(A), under the arbitration agreement in Salomon, all disputes were to 
be conducted by the NYSE and in accordance with their rules.
182
 If the 
NYSE refused to arbitrate a particular dispute, there was no further 
promise to arbitrate in another forum.
183
 Although neither the Salomon 
nor Green arbitration clauses used the word “exclusive” to designate 
the forum, that was the meaning inferred.
184
  
Additionally, Rule 48.D allowed the NAF to decline the use of 
arbitration for any dispute, after which the parties could seek legal and 
other remedies.
185
 The dissent’s understanding of Rule 48.D was in 
concert with the opinion of the Chief Executive Officer of the NAF. In 
an interview with National Public Radio just after the July 2009 
Minnesota settlement agreement, Chief Executive Officer Mike Kelly 
stated, “the logical conclusion of this decision is that the consumer 
cases will all now be brought in court.”
186
  
Although agreeing with the majority’s criticism of the non-
statutory integral part test for deciding when to invoke the court’s 
Section 5 power, the dissent came to the right conclusion that the NAF 
was the exclusive forum, and because it was unavailable, the parties 
should be able to proceed in litigation without being blocked by 
Section 5 of the FAA.  
 
D. Missed Connections in the Majority Opinion 
 
The majority opinion did not address contract law principles when 
defining the issues in Green. It did not consider whether there was a 
                                                 
181
 Id. at 798. The majority opinion distinguishes Salomon based on the 
language of the arbitration agreement (which used the word “exclusive”) and that 
Salomon arbitrator had discretion to send the dispute to court.  
182






 Id. at 798. 
186
 See Wade Goodwyn, Arbitration Firm Settles Minnesota Legal Battle, NPR 
(July 23, 2009, 6:00 AM) 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106913248 (discussing the 
NAF settlement). 
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meeting of the minds, even as a legal fiction, or whether there was a 
mistake in a term of the arbitration agreement.  
While on its short digression tethered to contract law, the majority 
failed to contemplate that the integral part test is analogous to asking 
whether a term in a contract is material. Inquiring whether the named 
arbitration forum is integral to the agreement is similar to asking if the 
identity of the forum was a material term in the agreement. A contract 
requires mutual assent to all material terms.
187
 A material term is a 
contractual provision, which concerns a significant issue such as 




A mutual mistake of a material fact occurs when there has been a 
meeting of the minds, but both parties are mistaken about the same 
material fact within the contract. As the Restatement (Second) of 




Simply put, there is a term in the arbitration agreement that was 
based on a mutual mistake of fact – the availability of the NAF as an 
arbitration forum. Thus, the fact situation in Green was different than 
the named forum becoming unavailable during the life of the contract, 
which was the case in Ranzy, Brown and Khan. However, what to do 
when the NAF was the designated forum in the Green arbitration 
agreement is appropriately addressed by the Third, Fifth and Eleventh 
circuits which have asked, whether the named arbitration forum was 
“integral” to the agreement, or, under the terms of contract law, 






                                                 
187
 Citadel Grp. Ltd. v. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr., 692 F.3d 580, 589 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
188
 Material Term Definition, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), 
available at Westlaw BLACKS.  
189
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981). 
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IV. THE AFTERMATH 
 
A. Consequences of the Majority Opinion 
 
The arbitration law created by the Supreme Court and expanded 
by the Seventh Circuit allows businesses to prey on consumers. As one 
commentator has stated, “[a]s architecture, the arbitration law made by 
the Court is a shantytown. It fails to shelter those who most need 
shelter. And those it is intended to shelter are ill-housed.”
190
 The 
majority’s opinion, which has been called “one of the most anti-
consumer”
191
 decisions of the year, has helped create this shantytown, 
resulting in immediate repercussions on the parties involved as well as 
future litigants. 
An immediate consequence of this opinion is that it denies Ms. 
Green her day in court and forecasts she will lose in arbitration. It has 
been established that the NAF is prejudicial to consumers. Thus 
requiring a substitute arbitrator to use NAF’s Code of Procedure may 
translate this prejudice into another forum. One major criticism of 
arbitration forums like the NAF is that their process inherently favors 
business over the individual.
192
 A display of this inequality can be 
found in California, where arbitration results are made public, and 
creditors won 99.8% of the time in NAF cases that were decided by 
arbitrators on the merits.
193
  
                                                 
190
 Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996). 
191
 Paul Bland, supra note 72. Paul Bland argued the appeal in Discover Bank, 
discussed in Section II. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 
2005).  
192
 See Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions on 
Corporate Misconduct and Laws Regulating Corporations, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON 
THE JUDICIARY (July 23, 2008), 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f73
5da13e81c7 (Elizabeth Harholet stating, “I concluded from this experience that the 
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There are also practical problems that result. The dissent considers 
the broad power the majority bestowed upon district courts.
194
 It opens 
the door to altering other terms of the arbitration agreement. The 
designation of an arbitration forum “has wide-ranging substantive 
implications that may affect, inter alia, the arbitrator-selection process, 
the law, procedures, and rules that govern the arbitration, the 
enforcement of the arbitral award, and the cost of the arbitration.”
195
  
In addition, requiring the district court to appoint a substitute 
arbitrator in the instant matter is in contravention to the FAA’s purpose 
of eliminating the costly and time-consuming litigation process. The 
consumer must first bring a cause of action to the district court so that 
the court may invoke Section 5 of the FAA to appoint a different 
arbitrator. Although the majority rejected the integral part test as time 
consuming and inefficient, the result of their opinion is no better: it 
adds an extra step in resolving disputes, which results in additional 
time and costs.  
Furthermore, appointing a substitute arbitrator in this situation is 
in direct opposition to the initial congressional support of the FAA. 
During the 1924 Joint Hearings, a supporter of the bill stated that the 
reason for the prior judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements 
was that stronger parties can prey on weaker ones, but that was no 
longer a concern at the time the FAA was passed. That worry, 
however, has arisen again due to the unequal bargaining power of a 
consumer and payday lender. 
 
B. Proposed Solutions 
 
Mounting arbitration reform efforts have slowly chipped away at 
the seemingly irrebuttable presumption that courts have given to the 
validity and enforcement of arbitration agreements. The power of state 
governments to step in and protect consumers has been weakened as a 
result of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and thus a state response 
is inappropriate. However, in the legislative arena, Congress has 
                                                 
194
 Green v. U.S. Cash Advance Illinois, LLC, 724 F.3d 787, 800 (7th Cir. 
2013) (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
195
 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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considered a variety of bills that would invalidate pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts. And, in the regularity 
sphere, the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau may 
be helpful. 
Two recently proposed laws aimed at eliminating contract 
provisions hidden in fine print that force people to arbitrate rather than 
go to court and/or participate in class actions
196
 are the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2013 and the Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011. 
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 declares that no pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement is valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of 
an employment, consumer, anti-trust or civil rights dispute.
197
 This 
proposed law has had several predecessors: the Consumer and 
Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights which gave way to the Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2002, followed by the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007 
and then the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009.
198
 The text of the 2013 
                                                 
196
 Mike Sacks, Arbitration Kickback: Supreme Court’s Anti-Consumer Rulings 
Trigger Democratic Bills, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 20, 2011, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/20/arbitration-supreme-court-decisions-
democratic-bills_n_1022207.html. Sacks notes that the three 2010-2011 Supreme 
Court decisions have divided the Supreme Court among familiar ideological lines 
like in abortion, affirmative action or campaign finance cases. 
197
 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). At the 
time of publication, this bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law. More information is available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1844. As the sponsor stated in the 
Bill’s introduction:  
Too many Americans are forced to give up their rights to have a trial by 
jury when it comes to these consumer agreements that they sign with 
these megabusinesses. My bill would remedy this by prohibiting any 
predispute agreement that requires arbitration for claims involving 
employees, consumers, civil rights, and antitrust.  We must protect our 
constitutional right to a fair trial by a jury of one's peers. I will continue 
to champion this bill until it is signed into law, and I urge my colleagues 
to support the Arbitration Fairness Act.  
113 Cong. Rec. S1, 2448 (daily ed. May 7, 2013) (statement of Rep. Hank Johnson).  
198
 Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap 
"Sophisticated Parties" Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 258 (2010). Although these 
predecessors were not passed, they did give way to the Franken Amendment to the 
May 19, 2010 Department of Defense appropriation bill. The Franken Amendment 
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Act is an amendment to the FAA. It begins with several congressional 
findings, including: the FAA was not intended to apply to consumer 
disputes; most consumers have little or no meaningful choice whether 
to submit their claims to arbitration; and mandatory arbitration 
undermines public law because there is inadequate transparency and 
judicial review of arbitrator’s decisions.
199
 The Act declares that no 
pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate shall be valid if it requires 
arbitration of a consumer dispute.
200
 
Similarly, the Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, which was 
introduced by a supporter
201
 of the Arbitration Fairness Act, sought to 
ban pre-dispute arbitration agreements for mobile phone service 
                                                                                                                   
“prohibits the use of funds made available by the legislation for any contract in 
excess of $1 million unless the defense contractor agrees not to require arbitration of 
Title VII or tort claims arising out of sexual harassment or assault as a condition of 
employment.” Id. 
199
 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). At the 
time of publication, this bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law. More information is available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1844. Section 2 of the Act states,  
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the 
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial 
entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power. 
(2) A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have 
interpreted the Act so that it now extends to consumer disputes and 
employment disputes, contrary to the intent of Congress.        
(3) Most consumers and employees have little or no meaningful choice 
whether to submit their claims to arbitration. Often, consumers and employees 
are not even aware that they have given up their rights.           
(4) Mandatory arbitration undermines the development of public law 
because there is inadequate transparency and inadequate judicial review of 
arbitrators' decisions.             
(5) Arbitration can be an acceptable alternative when consent to the 
arbitration is truly voluntary, and occurs after the dispute arises. 
200
 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (2013). At the 
time of publication, this bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Regulatory 
Reform, Commercial And Antitrust Law.  More information is available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1844.  
201
 Senator Richard Blumenthal introduced the bill on October 4, 2011. 
Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Congress (2011). More 
information is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.01652:.  
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 Thus, this was a direct result of the Concepciones 
opinion. This bill has had no movement since its introduction.
203
  
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, on the other hand, is 
a regulatory office conducting a study of consumer arbitration in 
connection with financial products and services.
204
 This study is a 
requirement of Section 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the Bureau is also authorized to “prohibit or impose 
conditions or limitations on arbitration agreements relating to a 
consumer financial product or service, if that prohibition, condition, or 
limitation is in the public interest and for the protection of 
consumers.”
205




The Seventh Circuit opinion in Green v. US Cash Advance 
supports the Supreme Court’s zealous enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and the “virtually irrebuttable federal preference for 
arbitration.”
206
 The majority’s ad hoc analysis, while rejecting the 
integral part test used by other circuit courts, begs the question – are 
arbitration agreements binding, valid and enforceable at all costs? Is 
the intent of the parties no longer a relevant question in contract 
interpretation? The dissent, although rejecting the integral part test, 
ultimately arrived at the correct conclusion through sound reasoning. 
Judge Hamilton used a common sense reading of the arbitration 
provision to determine the NAF was the exclusive but unavailable 
forum. As a result, and mindful that this was contract of adhesion, the 
right result would be to allow litigation. 
  
                                                 
202
 Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin A Cat: Qui Tam Actions As A State 
Legislative Response to Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203, 1212 (2013). 
203
 Consumer Mobile Fairness Act of 2011, S. 1652, 112th Congress (2011). 
More information is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d112:s.01652:.  
204
 CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).  
205
 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012).  
206
 Alexander, supra note 202, at 1204.  
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